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ABSTRACT
The article aims to conceptualize the contemporary illiberal model of state capitalism with the main 
focus on emerging economies. State capitalism is understood in a broad sense, as a multifaceted 
institutional construct, in which increased state interventionism is a steady feature, materializing in 
diverse forms. It is a first attempt to theorize and systematize the recent version of state capitalism 
along the Kornai’s system paradigm framework in a deductive-positivist way. Acknowledging that 
national varieties of contemporary statist experiments exist, the article aims at a higher abstraction 
level to define the operational logic and some common core characteristics of contemporary state- 
capitalist regimes, as a new type, a steady hybrid regime with its own values. Finally, it is argued that 
even though some illusionary short-term (economic) success stories have emerged, on the longer 
run illiberal statist measures aiming at consolidating political power at any costs, might undermine 
widely defined development.
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A new economic model is emerging during the last years 
throughout the world (from Russia and Turkey, to 
Brazil, China, Egypt, Thailand and the Philippines). To 
some extent this might seem a global phenomenon: 
since the 2008–9 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) state 
involvement in the economy has been on the rise world-
wide and democracy has also been backsliding globally. 
Both tendencies have been reinforced by the global 
spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and its conse-
quences. Throughout the world1 (though to very differ-
ent extents – see e.g. the International Monetary Fund’s 
COVID policy tracker2) governments have enacted 
heavy lockdown strategies to slowdown the spread of 
the virus and introduced stimulus packages to minima-
lize economic and social consequences. The role of the 
state has increased dramatically ranging from control-
ling social life to helping out some specific (strategic) 
sectors and providing social assistance to the most vul-
nerable groups. Though globally we consider this return 
of the interventionist state mostly as crisis-driven and 
anticyclical phenomenon, it is yet too early to draw any 
conclusions regarding the longer term impacts in gen-
eral regarding the workings of the capitalist system, and 
also in particular if focusing on the role of state in the 
economy.
In more developed countries the recent rise of state 
interventionism was directly linked to crisis manage-
ment, and remained mostly a cyclical phenomenon in 
the aftermath of the GFC, and thus similar tendencies 
are to be expected following the crisis induced by the 
recent coronavirus pandemic. In emerging economies, 
the recent rise of statism dates back to the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, though in some cases it was strengthened in 
the post-GFC era, and in almost all cases it has rein-
forced state interventionism amidst the recent pan-
demic. Nevertheless, in these less advanced countries 
the state has traditionally played an active role, and is 
historically more embedded in institutional and social 
memories.
The focus in this article is on the countries outside 
the core of the world economy, mainly emerging 
economies and to some extent the post-socialist bloc, 
which are considered as latecomers by development 
economists. While the increased role of the state in 
the economy in these countries seems to be a steady 
feature, the forms of this permanent state activity are 
diverse, ranging from state ownership and indirect 
forms of influencing micro-level decisions, through 
active structural policies, meddling with prices to 
paternalism and business-politics entanglement, and 
finally to increased corruption (as a systemic feature). 
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In many cases, the extended role of the state has some 
historic parallels of modernization and catching-up. 
Therefore, activist state can claim substantial social 
and political support, and this is often expressed in 
deliberate confrontations with the neoliberal political 
and economic agenda of the Great Moderation period. 
Rising state activism in the economy goes more often 
than not hand in hand with changes in the political 
realm. It currently coincides with the retreat of democ-
racy: tendencies towards autocratic governance style, 
personalist ruling, attacking checks and balances of 
political power and hurting independent institutions 
and agencies. In the political realm illiberalism 
(Zakaria, 1997), while in the economic sphere unortho-
dox or heterodox economic policies became the new 
catchwords.
With these historical antecedents, the aim is to con-
ceptualize the new forms of state-led developmentalism, 
with recent tendencies showing towards the spread of 
illiberalism both in the political and economic realms. 
Though different varieties of new statist models coexist 
in different countries, this article argues that there are 
sufficient commonalities to treat these together, and call 
it contemporary or illiberal state capitalism. This article 
is a first attempt to theorize and systematize the current 
version of state capitalism along the Kornai’s system 
paradigm framework in a deductive-positivist way and 
aims to shed light on the logic of its operation.
The need to consider these recent experiments 
together is further accentuated by at least two reasons. 
On the one hand new illiberal tendencies might provide 
recipes for other countries to emulate – a new role 
model seems to emerge, with an inherent risk of 
a continued spread of illiberalism worldwide. At the 
same time mutual efforts to use other illiberal experi-
ments as point of reference, might raise the (internal and 
external) legitimacy of these regimes, whereas emulating 
and further developing illiberal ideas might lead (as 
a vicious circle) to the “radicalization” of the model.
On the other hand, some common tendencies 
and consequences seem to show towards similar, non- 
developmental long-term outcomes (often oversha-
dowed by short-term economic growth rates and illu-
sionary success stories). Medium and long-term socio- 
economic consequences and their grievance might differ 
from country to country, depending mainly on the 
robustness of political and economic institutions, resi-
lience of democratic and market economic traditions 
and in more general terms on country-specific patterns 
of development levels, values and preferences. Most 
countries in the emerging world are however struggling 
to get out of the so-called middle-income trap (MIT), 
and their current economic policy agendas are more 
often than not revealing totally the opposite, than his-
torical examples and economic literature would suggest 
to be reasonable to avoid such a trap.
The article is in six parts. First, a short conceptual 
clarification is provided, and followed by a historical 
overview. The third section presents the theoretical 
background. Fourth, the anatomy of contemporary 
state-capitalist regimes is sketched, followed by 
a preliminary attempt to conceptualize contemporary 
state capitalism according to the revised system para-
digm. The final section concludes.
Conceptual clarification
Though the term state capitalism has its origins in the 
Marxist tradition, this article does not follow this 
approach. The term state capitalism has gone through 
a renaissance in the post-GFC period, and this contem-
porary resurgence is a descriptive, positive terminology, 
a less value-laden typology.
Instead of providing an extensive review of the state 
capitalism literature (for this Bałtowski et al., 2021; 
Ricz, 2018), here it is suffice to recall the rather broad, 
general definition of Bremmer (2009, p. 41), who was 
among the firsts to describe the recent statist wave. He 
defines state capitalism as “a system in which the state 
functions as the leading economic actor and uses mar-
kets primarily for political gains”. Most other interpre-
tations of state capitalism in the literature have a much 
narrower scope, and focus on state ownership or emer-
ging markets’ multinationals. This article applies the 
broader understanding (in line with Bremmer): con-
temporary state capitalism is considered as a new eco-
nomic model emerging in the era of globalization. 
Despite differences in its delineation and boundaries, 
there is consensus that rising state interventionism (in 
which state officials make – politically motivated – 
economic decisions over strategic investments, state 
ownership and regulation) can be observed throughout 
the emerging world, from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, China, 
Brazil, Mexico, Russia and India, and despite many 
country-specific characteristics, these share enough 
similarities to deserve the label state(-managed) capit-
alism (Bremmer, 2009, p. 41).
In this broad interpretation state capitalism is 
situated somewhere in the continuum between the 
two big types of existing socio-political formations, 
such as capitalism and socialism, potentially as a new 
emerging hybrid form in between, to depict contem-
porary changes in the rising role of state in economy. 
Thus, state capitalism refers to an overarching and 
growing (direct or indirect) state influence over the 
economy, which actively influences the long-term 
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development path of the country, with the ultimate aim 
however being the consolidation of political power over 
the long term.
The starting point of analysis is the assumption that 
the ultimate aim of contemporary state-capitalist 
regimes is political, and changes in the economic sphere 
are used as a tool for supporting this ultimate aim. In 
this vein the rise of state capitalism has to be considered 
in parallel with the awake of illiberalism in the political 
realm, the rise of autocracy. The term autocracy is used 
according to Kornai (2016), as a third type along the two 
traditional politico-governmental forms, democracy and 
dictatorship.
One of the main characteristics of hybrid regimes is 
that formally everything looks like “business as usual”, 
but in reality and practice significant deviations domi-
nate. As in the case of the differentiation of autocracy 
from democracy and dictatorship, it can be hypothe-
sized, that new state-capitalist regimes and the way 
these operate in reality, demonstrate huge deviations 
from both the capitalist and socialist regimes, and thus 
constitute to be a new type on its own value.
Historical antecedents
Without going into detailed historical analysis on the 
emergence of modern nation states and their interven-
tions, which at latest started with seventeenth and eight-
eenth century’s mercantilism, here it is sufficient to refer 
to three waves of modern state capitalism following 
Nölke’s (2014) periodization.
The first wave of statism dates back to the mid- to 
late nineteenth century’s trade protectionism, when 
many states aimed at developing their domestic indus-
tries by using tariffs and establishing various state 
infrastructures.
Following the early twentieth century’s liberalist 
decades it was only after the Great Depression, when 
the role of state in the economy has been strongly 
increased (such as in the United States, Europe and 
the Soviet Union): the second wave of statism started. 
The rise of the East Asian developmental states can be 
dated later, as it started only after the Second World 
War (though with important historical antecedents, 
especially in the case of Japan). Trade protectionism 
was replaced by incremental liberalization, and a much 
broader set of instruments emerged to protect domestic 
industries and steer industrial development towards 
strategic sectors. State capitalism 2.0, as called by 
Nölke (2014, p. 3) was characterized by the central 
role of economic planning and state interventionism 
has for several decades dominated the industrialization 
efforts of latecomer economies.
At the latest by the 80s and 90s the winds of global 
ideological changes have turned towards prioritizing 
market forces and have led to the rise of neoliberalism 
(mainly driven by the Reagan and Thatcher govern-
ments, and the decline of the East Asian developmental 
states). Finally, the third wave of state capitalism has 
started around the late 90s and early 2000s in emerging 
economies (such as China, Brazil and India), and 
reveals significant differences from the earlier versions. 
First, this new variant is a much more multifaceted 
institutional construct based “on a variety of formal 
and informal cooperative relationships between various 
public authorities and individual companies” (Ten 
Brink & Nölke, 2013, p. 26), and reveals consequently 
a different pattern of business and government rela-
tions. Second, new state-capitalist regimes are inte-
grated into an intensively globalized world economic 
system, and thus the strategic and selective use of 
inward and outward foreign direct investment became 
an important instrument to foster national economic 
development. Finally, the complexity of the operational 
logic of current statist regimes goes beyond the often 
cited close interlinkages between the state and multi-
nationals in emerging markets.
Correspondingly, our preliminary hypothesis runs as 
follows: contemporary state capitalism in latecomer 
economies is a steady and stable model variant, and 
not a merely transitionary phenomenon, but a new 
type with its own value. This entails, that political and 
economic institutions interact with each other, and these 
mutually reinforcing interdependencies provide certain 
stability for the model over time.
To empirically test this main hypothesis a series of 
country case studies shall be conducted as part of 
a larger research program, this concept paper however 
merely aims at providing the analytical framework, by 
critically engaging with existing literature, explaining 
the methodological starting point and highlighting 
some potential cornerstones of analysis.
Existing theoretical frameworks
Two broad strands of economic literature have ana-
lysed the first and second waves of state capitalism: the 
comparative capitalism research and the developmental 
state school. Both schools have their limitations if aim-
ing at systematically exploring contemporary statist 
tendencies.
With intellectual roots going back to the comparative 
system theory the comparative capitalism research 
agenda has been revived by the seminal work of Hall 
and Soskice (2001). The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
studies grew out of the observation that the development 
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patterns and capitalism models of the late-developing 
economies have diverged significantly from the classic 
(liberal market economy) model that emerged in 
England in the eighteenth century. Following this tradi-
tion an extensive literature has emerged analysing dif-
ferent capitalism variants, first mainly focusing on more 
advanced economies (see e.g. Amable, 2003; Baumol 
et al., 2007). The geographical focus was later extended 
to post-socialist economies (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012; 
Farkas, 2016; Nölke & Vliegenthart, 2009; Szelényi & 
Mihályi, 2020), and also to some other emerging regions 
(Nölke et al., 2019; Schneider, 2009; Schneider, 2013; 
Schedelik et al., 2020). For an excellent overview on 
new directions and cutting edge debates in comparative 
capitalism research see Ebenau et al. (2015).
While the intellectual forerunners of the VoC 
research have emphasized state policies and state- 
society relations lying beyond the different development 
patterns, Hall and Soskice (2001) and a range of succes-
sive studies, took a much more firm-focused view and 
concentrated on different institutional arrangements. 
The main argument – aiming at explaining why different 
capitalism models coexist on the long term without any 
reasonable convergence – was the following: institu-
tional complementarities in different segments of the 
economy, the state and the society (structured by 
Amable (2003) into the five areas of industrial relation, 
education and training, corporate finance, interfirm 
relations and corporate governance) reinforce each 
other. Thus, related institutions create increasing 
returns in the presence of others, and create stable insti-
tutional types with long-standing differences between 
the different types leading to path dependency over the 
long term. In the next section, we will show, that in 
contrast to these views, the developmental state school 
explaining the outstanding development performance of 
East-Asian economies, has highlighted the success stor-
ies of (state-led) path creation.
The VoC approach has its limitations at least in three 
ways, if aiming to systematically explore contemporary 
state capitalism. First, in the classic VoC literature coun-
tries of the Global South have been mostly neglected 
(except for some more recent works, such as Nölke 
et al., 2019; Schneider, 2013).
Second, most VoC analysis has not focused on insti-
tutional changes and their dynamics over time. In con-
trast if analysing the rise of contemporary state 
capitalism the need to reveal ongoing tendencies, direc-
tions of changes and in more general terms the evolution 
of (both formal and informal) institutional arrange-
ments is crucial.
The third limitation is the fundamental neglect of the 
role of state vis-à-vis the firms and other actors of the 
economy. It would be highly relevant to go back to the 
roots of comparative capitalism research, and revive the 
focus on state policies and state – society relations.
The argumentation on bringing back the state is 
a clear link to the other strand of literature, namely 
the developmental state (DS) school. Dating back to 
the 1980s and 1990s, the DS school has analysed the 
special East Asian way of catching up. Johnson (1982) 
has described the Japanese model as a capitalist plan- 
rational developmental state. The logic – in 
a nutshell – was that the state (via the elite bureau-
cracy and the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry) has relied on administrative guidance 
(such as selective industrial policies, subsidized credit, 
fiscal incentives and trade policies to promote 
exports, etc.) rather than on rigid regulatory schemes 
or direct state ownership (Onis, 1991). The Japanese 
DS has actively (and selectively) promoted external 
competitiveness and economic growth through a wide 
variety of market conforming tools, but at the same 
time it aimed at maintaining market competition to 
as high degree as it was compatible with its priorities.
During the following decades, the DS concept was 
applied and expanded by the so called revisionist school: 
first to South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, and then to 
other Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia, 
Thailand. With significant differences existing in the 
economic structures and strategies of these countries 
(Pempel, 1999), all have applied similar market- 
conforming tools of state interventions in the economy. 
Key features of classic developmental states were the 
high levels of disciplinary power exerted by the merito-
cratic bureaucracy (Amsden, 1989), the state-led gui-
dance of market processes in order to direct 
investment into selected strategic sectors (Wade, 1990) 
and embedded autonomy with regard to state – society 
relations (Evans, 1995).
At the same time the classic model of DS was 
embedded in situational imperatives and nationalism 
(Johnson, 1982, p. 307). A historical interplay of political, 
economic, ideational, social, regional and security forces 
has contributed to the East Asian economic miracle, part 
of these were time-related, while others were geographi-
cally determined and more region-specific. This set of 
systemic vulnerability conditions (Doner et al., 2005) has 
made the DS non-transferable and not-repeatable in 
other times and places, and the change of these contex-
tual factors has led to the demise of the classic DS model 
even within East Asia, clearly demonstrated at the latest 
by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–99 (Benczes, 2000, 
2002; Ricz, 2019; Woo-Cumings, 1999).
Even after decades of market-oriented and structural 
reforms, the state in many late-(late)comer economies 
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continues to play a significant (albeit mostly altered 
and transformed) role, and continuities in terms of 
institutions, economic policies and social memories 
with the past prevail. Statist tendencies have been 
revived first following the GFC and the exhaustion of 
the commodity boom, and more recently due to the 
global COVID-19 pandemic. Simultaneously with the 
shift in economic policy practices, the economic and 
developmental role of the state has been brought back 
to the centre of academic debate and the renaissance of 
the developmental state approach can be observed 
(Haggard, 2019; Mazzucato, 2013; Wade, 2014; 
Williams, 2014). This is however not the revival of the 
old, classic DS paradigm, but a new statist concept is 
emerging (Ricz, 2016; Wylde, 2017).
Finally as both the VoC literature and the 
Developmental State school have their limitations to con-
ceptualize contemporary state capitalism this article pro-
poses to rely on the systemic approach as presented by the 
Hungarian economist, Kornai (2000, 2016). It is argued, 
that the system paradigm (SP) – especially in its revised 
form – might be helpful for the comparative analysis of 
contemporary state capitalism, even though it was mostly 
applied by Kornai and his followers on the post-socialist 
transition process. The application of the SP to thoroughly 
analyse a new phenomenon in a basically new geographical 
context might be regarded as a novelty, or at least as a new 
(empirical) test for its robustness.
First, the main attributes of the system paradigm shall 
be recalled (Kornai, 2000, pp. 121–134): 1. focus on “the 
system as a whole”; 2. analysis embedded in general and 
comprehensive social sciences; 3. focus on institutions 
with a crucial differentiation between the system- 
specific characteristics of a system, and other attributes, 
which are rather consequences of other circumstances; 
4. a historical perspective to understand current organi-
zation forms of economy, society and politics; 5. the 
individual preferences are embedded in and shaped by 
the system; 6. focus on the constantly changing society, 
interest in big changes and big transformations; 7. focus 
on intrinsic dysfunctional characteristics of a system, 
which cannot be eliminated only alleviated within the 
boundaries of the system; 8. qualitative and quantitative 
comparative analysis.
As an additional feature (in relation with the cur-
rently ongoing global debates on methodological issues 
in economics, see e.g., Csaba, 2016; Rodrik, 2015) it has 
to be highlighted, that the methodology of the SP in 
particular is much softer, than that of the mainstream 
economics relying mostly on mathematical models. As 
this latter operates on a high abstraction level, and thus 
looks only at a narrow slice of the real world, while the 
SP in contrast aims to analyse the system in its entirety, 
to capture the reality in the most possible comprehen-
sive way, and for this sake “it is prepared to make heavy 
concessions in rigor and exactitude” (Kornai, 2000, 
p. 124).
The soft methodology does not only materialize in 
the multidisciplinary characteristic of the analysis, but 
also in its vocabulary. This means rather relying on 
terms such as dominant features or dominance, instead 
of precisely define exact threshold for one or other 
aspect (as these precise measures might be very different 
according to historical, geographical, cultural or other 
specificities of the given countries). The aim is to reveal 
tendencies, and not necessarily quantify specific levels, 
as the dynamics and directions of changes are of impor-
tance, and not the static picture.
Kornai (2000) has systematically explored the two 
great systems in the economic realm: the capitalist and 
socialist system, as two theoretical types of existing 
socio-political formation (or ideal types using Max 
Weber’s terminology – see also Hay, 2020). While 
admitting that actual, individual historical varieties of 
both capitalism and socialism have existed in different 
countries, and different time periods, his aim was to 
identify characteristics distinguishing the two types on 
the one hand, and to draw attention to commonalities 
beyond the many individual specificities occurring in 
each country belonging to the same type, on the other 
hand. For this sake primary, system-specific characteris-
tics were identified, which determine the system as 
a whole, and which constitute to be necessary and suffi-
cient for the appearance of the secondary characteristics. 
This hierarchical relation between the primary (decisive) 
characteristics and the secondary (reactive) ones, is 
however not necessarily a deterministic one.
In the political realm, in the revised form of SP 
Kornai distinguishes three types: the two traditional 
politico-governmental forms, democracy and dictator-
ship, and a third form, called autocracy. However, with 
Kornai’s words (Kornai, 2016, p. 566) “autocracy, in this 
paradigm, is no blurred “middle way” between democracy 
and dictatorship, but a sharply identifiable type in the 
sense Max Weber termed an “ideal type”. It is 
a theoretical construct that in my approach is distinct 
from two other types: democracy and dictatorship”.
To explore current statist tendencies we are con-
vinced, that looking at – mutually reinforcing – interac-
tions between the economic and political realm is 
crucial. At first sight, a naïve spectator would probably 
connect the capitalist system with democracy and soci-
alism with dictatorship, history has however provided 
evidence that the relation between the different types of 
economic and political systems is much more complex: 
capitalism is feasible even without democracy, under 
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autocratic regime or even under dictatorship, while 
democracy cannot operate without capitalism (Kornai, 
2016, p. 569). Looking at contemporary state capitalist 
examples the picture is even more nuanced: there are 
authoritarian3 and democratic regimes, as well as 
a range of others falling in between the two ideal types 
on the political spectrum. Relying on Kurlantzick’s 
(2016, pp. 28–29) interpretation it is straightforward to 
see that the most authoritarian state-capitalist regimes 
tend to be the least efficient economically on the longer 
run (such as Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Egypt, Iran, Algeria or Russia). Being the most demo-
cratic regime does not necessarily lead to the highest 
levels of economic efficiency, however some degree of 
political openness and responsiveness to popular senti-
ment is needed to make state capitalism economically 
more efficient over time. Furthermore we contend, that 
this static picture might be to some extent misleading, as 
to reveal most recent changes in the political and eco-
nomic sphere, and the consequent developmental out-
comes, qualitative analysis and the exploration of 
tendencies is of crucial relevance. The more so, as it is 
suspected that the two processes of autocratic political 
changes and the rise of state interventionism in the 
economy are interwoven, and might mutually reinforce 
each other.
The Anatomy of Contemporary State Capitalist 
Regimes
Acknowledging the fact, that contemporary statist 
experiments differ from each other in many aspects, 
the starting point to conceptualize contemporary state 
capitalism, shall be the analysis of different country 
cases. At the same time on a higher abstraction level 
some core characteristics might stand out as defining 
features of contemporary state capitalism. Based on for-
mer research4 on emerging economies (such as on Brazil, 
Egypt, South Africa, Argentina and the classic Asian 
developmental states), and in line with existing economic 
literature on state capitalism, this section aims at drawing 
up the operational logic of contemporary state capitalism 
and highlight some outstanding similarities.
It is presumed, that core mechanisms operate along 
similar logic in most contemporary state capitalist regimes, 
as they share the ultimate aim to monopolize political 
power and to maximize their time in power (more often 
than not relying on strong, charismatic leaders with per-
sonal aspiration to remain in power even beyond the 
legally, constitutionally allowed periods). Illiberal states 
are using diverse forms of state interventions in the econ-
omy for purely political aims, thus to maintain political 
power as long as possible. A good example is provided by 
Yakovlev (2006), who demonstrates how in Russia under 
little political competition and weak mechanisms of 
democratic control the economy (business) was captured 
by the state for its own purposes. Similar tendencies were 
present under the 14 years of Worker’s Party ruling in 
Brazil (Saad-Filho & Morais, 2018). Other examples pre-
vail throughout the emerging world.
Business capture however is just one tool to maintain 
political power, and from country to country many 
creative and innovative tools can be observed to secure 
both the economic and political legitimacy of state capi-
talist regimes. In the economic realm some countries 
rely on external sources (such as oil revenues, EU 
funds, or unconditional loans from alternative sources), 
while others are also successful in internally raising 
funds (such as mobilising or even confiscating domestic 
savings, re-nationalising strategic companies, or relying 
on monetary policy measures). In reality most state 
capitalist regimes rely on different combinations of 
external and internal resources to finance their national 
priorities. In the political realm the creation of a non- 
level playing field for democratic elections can be often 
observed, while political power is also supported by the 
elimination of potentially critical voices, leading to con-
straints on free press and media, civil organizations, 
academic freedom, etc. Economic populist measures 
have been also on the rise as a means to influence the 
electorate, ranging from price subventions of basic 
goods and services via huge prestige investments and 
mega-sport events to supporting national champions as 
symbols of national development. Sometimes geopoliti-
cal and -strategical aspects, such as aspirations to 
become a global (or at least regional) leader have been 
also at play. Nationalist tendencies often go hand in 
hand with anti-globalist rhetoric, though this rather 
selectively trickles down to economic policies and prac-
tices. The economic viability of these new state capitalist 
model usually depends heavily on foreign direct invest-
ment and multinational companies (both in terms of tax 
revenues and employment). The positive discriminative 
treatment of foreign capital is often institutionalized via 
strategic partnership agreements, while a more negative 
attitude towards them might materialize in the form of 
specific tax levies on a selective and discretionary basis 
(or in extreme cases in nationalization and hostile reg-
ulatory or financial measures).
As main cornerstones, or at least some outstanding 
common elements of contemporary state capitalist 
regimes the following features can be highlighted:
● the return of the state as designer of economic 
development (active role in shaping economic 
structures via multiple channels ranging from own-
ership rights, and regulatory mechanisms to selec-
tive policy measures);
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● overarching centralization tendencies prevailing in 
decision-making and in exercise of power (both in 
politics and the economy);
● intensifying entanglements of business and politics, 
leading to state/business capture;
● widespread corruption (rent-seeking, patronage 
and cronyism) dominating, as an embedded 
social phenomenon, a special tool of economic 
coordination;
● legitimacy of strong states/leaders, rooting in 
socially expected paternalism.
This list also highlights the importance of the interactive 
linkages between the economic and political realm along 
the systemic approach, which is essential to understand 
the operational logic of current state capitalist regimes.
Furthermore, as the ultimate aim of contemporary 
state capitalist regimes is to maintain political power, 
questions of economic efficiency and social equality, or 
the goal of long-term economic development is of sec-
ondary relevance at best. A recent volume (Gerőcs and 
Szanyi, 2019) has argued that new “nationalist tenden-
cies” are better captured under the term of economic 
patriotism (see also Clift & Woll, 2012), however in 
a very specific form, as these rather serve a tiny part of 
the nation, the political patriots and loyal (newly estab-
lished or co-opted) economic elites.
Even if it is admitted that different varieties of con-
temporary SC co-exist, it might be worth to highlight 
some further commonalities of most recent illiberal sta-
tist tendencies:
● attacks on institutionalized checks and balances, 
and curtailing the independence of institutions 
and agencies;
● attacks on the media and free press;
● attacks on minorities and marginalized social 
groups (and their social mobility);
● attacks on NGO-s and civil organizations, human 
right groups;
● attacks on the autonomy of science and education;
● attacks on environmental sustainability and justice 
(and the fight against climate change).
A rather crosscutting issue is also emerging in most 
observed cases: the spread of overarching corruption 
and rent-seeking mechanisms draining resources from 
productive investments and distorting the behaviour of 
economic agents (Mihályi & Szelényi, 2019), thus posing 
a heavy threat on long-term economic development 
trajectory.
Finally, on a rather intuitive way a further aspect might 
be added: illiberal measures aiming at consolidating 
political power on the short term might add up and lead 
to rather anti- or non-developmental on the longer term. 
To provide some classic examples we can refer to the 
short termist business-oriented attacks on environmental 
sustainability, populist measures acting against social 
cohesion, or the attacks against the academic freedom 
and free press. It is also straightforward to see that mega-
lomaniac, nationalist (often luxury and prestige) infra-
structural policies drain resources from public budget and 
lead to underinvestment into productive infrastructure, 
health and education systems. Overarching centralization 
and autocratic tendencies tend to limit the chances of 
bottom up feedback and undermine responsiveness to 
popular sentiment. All these forces are unconducive to 
broadly defined sustainable development (based on struc-
tural changes towards a knowledge and innovation-led, 
socially inclusive and environmental-friendly economic 
trajectory) on the long run.
Regarding the sustainability of such regimes the strik-
ing example might be Venezuela, where the post- 
Chavista regime is struggling to survive, but this struggle 
goes on already for more than 6 years. The Venezuelan 
story also highlights the well-known trade-off in hybrid 
regimes, when economic legitimacy is waning, increased 
political repression is often the answer and might 
lengthen the survival of the political regime (at huge 
social and economic costs).
On the short run, illiberal capitalist regimes might 
realize relatively good economic growth, mostly based 
on some country-specific (and timely constrained) fac-
tors (such as the commodity boom, especially high oil 
prices, external funds or other “creatively raised” inter-
nal or even external resources), which might provide 
these regimes with short-term macro-economic legiti-
macy. Prioritising short term (political and economic) 
gains over longer term socio-economic development 
might be a viable strategy in some cases for some time. 
The sustainability of the regime depends on the question 
what happens when it fails on the macroeconomic or 
social front. Besides Venezuela also Turkey might offer 
some interesting insights (Kutlay, 2019; Onis, 2019).
It might seem mysterious how and why state capital-
ist regimes work in the twenty-first century, as it is 
obvious, that most of these regimes contradict every-
thing we know from development theories and prac-
tices, not least regarding the question how to escape 
the middle-income trap. Even though many debates 
are still not settled related to the MIT, regarding some 
basic points there is common agreement in literature: 
difficulties to catch up go back to the slowdown of 
productivity growth rates. To restore productivity 
growth a broad range of upgrading policies are needed, 
which means (among others) “more and better education 
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(especially higher and technical), greater savings and 
better investment, better infrastructure, and more inno-
vation and r and d” (Doner & Schneider, 2016, p. 2). 
These require institution-intensive qualitative changes 
which in turn presuppose long time horizons and over-
arching political commitment (going beyond electoral 
cycles in democracies). It is straightforward to see, how 
economic policy practices of current state capitalists 
contradict all these mentioned elements.
Towards a New Concept of Contemporary State 
Capitalism
A general characteristic of hybrid regimes is that at 
first sight these tend to look different than they are in 
reality (we can call this a “hidden” or Janus-faced nature 
of contemporary state capitalism). In the political 
sphere, for example, the democratic facade is often 
maintained to pretend to be democratic (de jure), and 
real (de facto) characteristics embodied in practical deci-
sions, implementations and everyday life remain often 
hidden for outsiders (Levitsky & Way, 2002). Similar 
discrepancies prevail in the economic sphere, such as 
a privately owned enterprise might be under total or 
significant (but hidden) state control.
To conceptualize contemporary state capitalism three 
main elements of the system paradigm (Kornai, 2016, 
p. 553) shall be recalled. First, it has to be explored 
whether the dominant political group ensures the dom-
inance of private or public property and of market or 
bureaucratic coordination. Assuming that in current 
state capitalist regimes the ruling political group aims 
at consolidating its own political power by all means and 
costs, the ruling political party tends to extend public 
influence, hurting both private property and market 
coordination though often on a hidden way but to 
a significant extent.
Accordingly, first the main characteristics of the 
political system of current state capitalist regimes have 
to be analysed. This needs country-based analysis case 
by case, however the general intuition is, that in recent 
state capitalist regimes illiberal political tendencies pre-
vail, hurting political pluralism and participation; 
voice, accountability and transparency; civil liberties; 
the rule of law; existing checks and balances; indepen-
dence of institutions and agencies; freedom of the 
press, etc.
The second domain to analyse along the systemic 
approach of Kornai, is the dominant form of property. 
In most cases, this remains private ownership (despite 
existing re-nationalization examples), however strong 
tendencies show towards extending government 
control and influence via various (indirect) channels 
(Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014). The political ruling 
group in most state capitalist regimes relies on rising 
state control over the economy. The analysis of these 
multifaceted forms of state involvements lies at the heart 
of many existing works in state capitalism research. This 
includes direct and indirect varieties of state ownership – 
ranging from state as an entrepreneur, to majority and/ 
or minority shareholder models, to ownership stake or 
indirect interference via development banks, pension 
funds or sovereign wealth funds –, but also forced or 
hidden forms of nationalization, or the building and 
strengthening of new economic elites, the new oligar-
chy – selected upon political loyalty – can be mentioned, 
with many other legal or even informal measures 
existing.
The third aspect to explore is the dominance of 
coordination mechanisms, which might range from 
market to bureaucratic, but even ethic and forced 
mechanisms of coordination might prevail. As these 
coordination mechanisms might co-exist side by side, 
it is of crucial relevance to decide which is the domi-
nant force. Most state capitalist regimes show an 
inherent tendency towards rising formal and informal 
state (political) control over the economy, which leads 
to distorting, constraining market forces, and opening 
ways to non-market types of coordination mechan-
isms. Government practices to own, guide or even 
micro-manage the economy differ from case to case 
(Szanyi, 2019), but among others these might take the 
following forms: economic and market regulation; 
industrial and development policies; state-business 
entanglements, in particular meddling with prices, 
creating formal or informal entry barriers, applying 
selective and discretionary measures to provide or 
constrain competitive advantages of certain actors/ 
sectors, such as building strategic alliances with 
selected private enterprises (to co-opt them with dis-
cretionary tools via direct support – such as tax 
exemptions – or via indirect methods – such as public 
procurement practices, etc.). The reliance on discre-
tionary decisions, centralization of decision-making 
and the increasing role of relational mechanisms, per-
sonal ties became dominant in recent state capitalist 
experiments (Kollai, 2020). This has resulted that 
extensive and embedded corruption and rent-seeking 
mechanisms became an inherent feature of recent 
state capitalist regimes, and are more and more con-
sidered as a systemic characteristic (Szelényi & 
Mihályi, 2020). Corruption and rent-seeking schemes 
in these cases relate to political hierarchies and ties, 
and ensure the loyalty of insiders (along the conven-
tional populist sentiment, namely “who is not with us 
is against us”).
Looking towards the secondary characteristics the 
picture gets even more blurred, and it is less possible 
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to stick strongly to the original structure of Kornai’s 
analysis. In terms of the power relations between the 
two sides of the market for goods and services, current 
state capitalist regimes are closer to the classic capitalist 
supply economies (though extreme counter examples 
exist, such as Venezuela). Looking at the power relations 
between the two sides of the labour market, it is rather 
difficult to draw up any general tendency, as it depends 
heavily on country-specific characteristics, such as his-
torical, institutional and social factors, or the rates and 
qualities of economic growth. Regarding the resulting 
income distribution the results are similarly indecisive, 
however tendencies show towards increasing divide 
between the new elite and the ordinary people (with 
traditional channels of social mobility often destroyed), 
but levels of inequality are rather path dependent (with 
some exceptions, such as the Latin American cases in the 
post-2000 era). Regarding the speed and qualitative fea-
tures of technical progress (innovation) and the softness 
or hardness of the budget constraint for firms, current 
state-capitalist regimes resemble more the typical socia-
list economies. We just have to recall the rather soft 
budget constraints for politically loyal national firms, 
and the fact that by switching off market-based compe-
titive pressures technological progress tends to slow 
down and the incentives (and thus probability) to gen-
erate revolutionary innovation are weakened.
To sum up it has been argued that in current state- 
capitalist regimes the ruling political group aims to raise 
exclusive and discretionary power to decide upon owner-
ship forms and upon the mixes (boundaries) of market and 
bureaucratic coordination. In this undertaking most state 
capitalists rely on centralized exercise of power, further 
reinforced by personalist rule, where the power is often 
concentrated in the hand of one strong, charismatic leader.
Conclusions
A new model of state capitalism has emerged during 
the last decades throughout the emerging world. In 
emerging economies and in some countries of the 
post-socialist world state interventionism is a more 
entrenched characteristic (and not a transitional phe-
nomenon) with long historical roots and social 
embeddedness, revealing different characteristics as 
the classic capitalist or socialist models.
Current economic literature on state capitalism is 
most often focusing on the rising role of state ownership, 
and policies promoting national champions (Musacchio 
& Lazzarini, 2014; Naughton & Tsai, 2015). It has been 
argued that these issues represent only one layer of the 
rising state dominance over the economy and the cur-
rent version of state capitalism represents “a complex 
systemic change involving changes in economic and mar-
ket regulations, development policy, social policies and 
possesses strong linkages to political institutions” 
(Szanyi, 2018, p. 143).
A broad conceptual framework was proposed to 
account for the characteristics of both the economic and 
political sphere, by applying the Kornai’s (revised) system 
paradigm (and going beyond its traditional terrain).
State capitalism was understood as a robust, rising 
and complex role of the state in the economy with the 
ultimate aim to consolidate political power of the ruling 
elite. In this interpretation state capitalism goes beyond 
state ownership, and shall be regarded as a distinct type 
of politico-economic organizational form, in which the 
state aims to take the leading role in the economic and 
political sphere, while maintaining (at least not fully 
eliminating) basic tenets of capitalism, such as 
a certain degree of market coordination and private 
property. At the same time, systemic changes attack 
the conventional tenets of market economies, though 
often on a hidden, less visible way, and consequently it 
is more difficult to monitor and depict (or even quan-
tify) these changes (along the hidden or Janus-faced 
nature of hybrid regimes in general, and contemporary 
state capitalism in particular). Parallel to the newly 
emerging autocracies or hybrid political regimes, it can 
be seen that in the economic realm new statist tenden-
cies are hacking the economic systems from within. 
These tend to maintain the facades and pretend the 
usual (market-led) business and economic mechanisms, 
however beyond the surface new state-(or even politics-) 
led practices emerge and dominate. The article has pro-
vided a first attempt to conceptualize state capitalism as 
a hybrid category between the two great economic sys-
tem types, capitalism and socialism. The outbreak of the 
coronavirus pandemic has led to significant changes 
with regard to the role of state in the economy world-
wide. It is however yet to be seen, whether related 
changes remain cyclical in their nature (as it is presumed 
in the more advanced world), or whether some illiberal 
leaders will use the pandemic as a pretext to further 
strengthen their rule and radicalize their statist regimes 
(as first tendencies tend to reveal in some emerging 
economies). Yet, we still lack the historical perspective 
to make any preliminary statement regarding these ten-
dencies and expected outcomes.
The article has highlighted that on a lower abstraction 
level national differences exist (and might be reinforced 
and/or modified by the different strategies applied in 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic). Consequently, 
national varieties of state capitalism can be differentiated 
and shall be further analysed. A new research agenda on 
the Varieties of State Capitalism (VoSC) is in place.
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